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Abstrace 
The possibilities  to  improve  households'  eligibility for  long-term housing  loans  at 
fixed interest rates has been a current topic of  public discussion. Yet, credit institutions 
have difficulties in granting such loans, unless they themselves can acquire fixed-rate 
funding. In many cases, the only feasible way for them to raise such funding is to issue 
bonds. In a number of  countries, such arrangements are already in use. 
In this paper we present a cross-country study of housing finance by mortgage-
backed bonds. The paper describes and analyses mortgage credit markets in Denmark, 
Sweden and the United States of America with respect to the institutional structure, 
loans  and  bonds  characteristics,  legal  framework  and  the  security  underlying  the 
system.  We  have  found  that  all  three  markets  differ  and  that  these  differences 
originate from the respective countries' national characteristics and fmancial histories. 
In Sweden and the United States in particular, the public sector has been involved in 
developing the system. 
Generally, long-term credit is offered in all  three countries through relatively 
well-functioning, efficient markets. However, certain  problems are common to all. 
First,  the  number  of outstanding  bond  series  is  relatively  large.  Second,  in  many 
housing loans, the borrower has  the option to repay the debt prematurely.  In these 
cases, the credit institution may have to avoid maturity matching problems by issuing 
bonds with unknown maturity. 
We briefly review the history and present circumstances of  Finnish bond issuing 
credit institutions to elucidate why such institutions play a marginal role. Long ago, 
bond-issuing  mortgage  institutions  were  an  essential  part  of the  Finnish  financial 
market, but legislative obstacles  to  their operations  almost killed the industry after 
World War IT.  The tax  system favoured  ordinary banks,  and bond emissions were 
restricted by government regulations. Now, these legal obstacles have been abolished. 
In the light of both foreign  and past domestic experience,  such institutions have a 
market niche. Finally, we discuss some of the problems related to setting up a bond-
financed mortgage credit market in Finland. 
Key words: Housing loans, bonds, mortgage banks 
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3 Tii vistelma 
Suomessa  on  viime  aikoina  keskusteltu  keinoista.  parantaakotitalouksien 
mahdollisuuksia  saada pitkfurlkaisia,  kiinteakorkoisia asuntoluottoja.  Luottolaitosten 
on  vaikea  tarjota  tallaisia  lainoja,  elleivat  ne  itse  voi  hankkia  pitkaaikaista, 
kiinteakorkoista  rahoitusta.  Useissa  tapauksissa  tama  on  mahdollista  vain 
joukkovelkakiIjaemissioin.  Monissa  maissa  onkin  joukkovelkakiIjoja  emittoivia 
luottolaitoksia, jotka myontavat pitkaaikaisia asuntoluottoja kiinteakorkoisina. 
Keskustelualoitteessa luodaan katsaus joukkovelkakiIjaemissioihin pohjautuviin 
asuntorahoitusjfujestelmiin kolmessa maassa, Tanskassa, Ruotsissa ja Yhdysvalloissa. 
Tanskassa ja Ruotsissa kiinnitysluottolaitokset seka myontavat luottoja etta laskevat 
liikkeeseen  arvopapereita.  Yhdysvalloissa  tavalliset  pankit  voivat  myyda  asunto-
luottojen  velkomisoikeuksia  joukkovelkakiIjarahoitteisille  erikoisrahoituslaitoksille. 
Etenkin  Ruotsissa  ja Yhdysvalloissa  julkinen  sektori  on  aktiivisesti  osallistunut 
jfujestelman kehittamiseen. 
Naiden  kolmen  maan  jfujestelmat  tuntuvat  paasaantOisesti  toimivan  melko 
hyvin, mutta niissa on myos  samantyyppisia ongelmia. JoukkovelkakiIjaemissioiden 
suuri  maara  ja  pieni  koko  vahentavat  lainojen  likviditeettia  jalkimarkkinoilla. 
Toisaalta  asuntovelalliselle  jaava  oikeus  maksaa  laina  takaisin  ennen  erapaivaa 
aiheuttaa  ongelmia  luottolaitokselle  erityisesti  kiinteakorkoisessa  luototuksessa. 
Luottolaitos  voi  tallaisessa  tapauksessa  suojautua  korkoriskilta  jfujestamalla 
varainhankintaa  joukkovelkakiIjoilla,  joiden  maturiteetti  riippuu  velallisten 
takaisinmaksuista. 
Keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan myos Suomen joukkovelkakiIjarahoitteisten 
luottolaitosten  historiaa  ja  nykypaivaa.  Pohditaan,  miksi  joukkovelkakiIjoihin 
pohjautuvilla  asuntorahoitusjfujestelmilla  on  niin  vahainen  merkitys  Suomessa. 
JoukkovelkakiIjoja  emittoineet  ja  kiinnelainoja  myontaneet  hypoteekkipankithan 
olivat  olennainen  osa  suomalaista  rahoitussektoria  1900-luvun  alussa.  Niiden 
merkitys  kuitenkin  vaheni  jyrkasti,  koska  julkisen  vallan  saadokset  vaikeuttivat 
niiden toimintaa  1930-luvulta 1980-luvulle saakka.  Verojfujestelma suosi tavallisia 
pankkeja, ja  joukkovelkakiIjojen liikkeeseenlaskua rajoitettiin. Nykyaan naita julkisen 
vallan  saadosten  aiheuttamia esteita ei enaa oleo  Ulkomaisten  kokemusten  mukaan 
tallaisille rahoituksenvalityspalveluille olisi kysyntaa nykyaankin. Niinpa viimeisessa 
luvussa kasitellaan tallaisten laitosten perustamiseen ja toimintaedellytyksiin liittyvia 
kysymyksia. 
A  vainsanat: Asuntolainat, joukkovelkakiIjat, hypoteekkipankit 
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5 1  Introduction 
The last recession has caused an investment slump in the Finnish housing market. 
Now its persistent effects are threatening the stable functioning of the market for real 
property. Consequently, construction and renovation activity is deeply depressed, 
contributing to record unemployment in this country. One feature that contributes to 
the present situation is  the limited development of long-term credit markets  in 
Finland. The barriers to obtaining credit with a  maturity longer than 20 years, broad 
interest rate spreads and juicy commission levels all work to restrain opportunities 
for obtaining the necessary funding for investing in housing. Quite predictably, it 
helps constrain demand for real property and depress construction sector. 
As in virtually every industrialised country, home buying is typically the largest 
investment decision made by a private Finnish citizen during his lifetime. Housing 
purchases have traditionally been financed as bank loans and large shares of own-
financing, limiting the possibilities of housing purchase. 
The  main  purpose  of efficient  financial  markets  is  to  reallocate  financial 
resources from lenders to borrowers as efficiently, cheaply and safely as possible. 
Consequently, financial markets should provide the necessary capital for housing as 
efficiently and cheaply as possible given the risk and debt capacity of the borrower. 
National characteristics such as legislation, and differences in economic history 
have  influenced the  structure  of the  emerging  national  financial  markets.  This 
directly affects the organisation and functioning of national financial markets. 
The  aim  of this  paper is  to  explore  alternative  avenues  of structuring  the 
financial system such that long term credit for real property purchase can be obtained 
cheaply  and  safely.  In  section  2,  we  present  a  cross-country  study,  giving  a 
comprehensive description and analysis of the mortgage market for housing finance 
in Denmark, Sweden and the United States. The purpose is to describe and analyse 
how these countries have structured their markets for housing finance to provide 
long-term credit efficiently. In section 3, existing Finnish arrangements of housing 
finance are described and analysed. In section 4, several aspects of mortgage credit 
finance  in  the  countries  studied  are  brought up  and discussed with respect  to 
establishing a bond-financed mortgage credit market in Finland. 
7 2  Country studies of mortgage credit systems 
National mortgage credit systems often differ, reflecting the national history of 
financial  development  and  characteristics.  National  tax  legislation  is  also  a 
significant factor influencing the structure and setting of the market for real property 
finance. This section aims to give a comprehensive description of mortgage credit 
financing of real property purchases in the following countries; Denmark, Sweden 
and the US. Its purpose is to describe the structure of each country's mortgage credit 
system with special emphasis on the legal framework behind the system as well as 
how the market functions and the security covering the system. By mortgage credit 
we  understand collerateralised loans  financed  in  the  bond market.  We seek to 
highlight common characteristics as well as relative advantages or drawbacks to the 
systems described. 
2.1  Denmark 
Denmark has an almost two-hundred-year-old tradition of financing real property 
purchases through mortgage credit. Today, the Danish mortgage market (considering 
the size of the Danish economy) is one of  the most competitive and best-functioning 
of its kind in the world. Long experience of mortgage lending based on bonds and 
strict regulation by the authorities have developed the Danish mortgage market into 
a market that provides low-cost credit efficiently to home owners. 
2.1.1  History 
Since the founding of the first Danish mortgage bank in 1797, the Danish mortgage 
market has expanded considerably (Realkreditnldet 1994). The first Mortgage Credit 
Act was passed in 1850, and mortgage credit institutions have since held a leading 
position in the financing of real property in Denmark. The intention of the Act was 
to create an institutional system that could contribute the national capital market with 
efficient reallocation of credit from lenders (creditors) to borrowers (debtors). The 
first  Mortgage  Credit  Act  aimed  at  securing  the  solidity  and  stability  of the 
institutions and the credibility of the bonds, which was believed to be an essential 
condition for a well-functioning capital market. Basically, these principles are still 
the foundation of the most recent Mortgage Credit Act of 1989. 
Before 1970, 24 mortgage credit institutions were granted the right to provide 
mortgage credit to finance real property purchase with the property as  mortgage. 
These  institutions  were  divided  into  three  categories;  (1)  first-mortgage  credit 
associations,  (2)  second-mortgage credit associations  and  (3)  housing mortgage 
funds. As a result of the Mortgage Credit Reform of 1970, these institutions were 
8 transformed into four unity mortgage institutions and three special mortgage credit 
institutions.2 The Mortgage Credit Reform of 1970 reformed the mortgage credit 
system in Denmark in the following ways: 
A unity mortgage credit system was established. 
The Needs Criterion was introduced, granting the Minister of Housing the right 
to  approve  new  institutions  based on  an  evaluation  of the  needs  for  new 
institutions. 
Classification of loans according to the property category and the purpose of the 
loan. 
The Reform generally aimed at restraining the number of institutions, and further 
imposed restrictions on the lending procedure to dampen economic activity. These 
additional changes  mainly involved shorting of the maximum maturity of loans and 
setting loan ceilings and lending limits.3 
The role  of mortgage credit in  the Danish financial  system has  resulted in 
mortgage credit regulations on several occasions in the  1970s  and  1980s.  Such 
amendments changes were often motivated by the government's economic policy. 
Nevertheless,  the  Mortgage  Credit  Act  of  1989  implemented  EC  legislation 
requirements into the law, introducing supplementary mortgage loans and allowing 
for extension of maturity. 
2.1.2  Institutions 
Prior to the 1970 reform, the Danish mortgage credit market was characterised by a 
large diversity of small, specialised mortgage institutions. The reform, however, 
resulted in a series of mergers of these smaller institutions and the creation of a few 
large unity mortgage credit institutions. The organised mortgage credit market in 
Denmark today mainly consists of 8 mortgage credit institutions, of which only six 
provide credit for housing finance. These institutions are: 
NykreditNS 
Realkredit Danmark NS 
Totalkredit Realkreditfond 
Danske Kredit NS 
Unikredit NS 
Landsbankernes Reallanefond 
Except for Danske Kredit NS and Unikredit NS, all  these institutions are  self-
governing. Danske Kredit NS and Unikredit NS are owned by Den Danske Bank 
NS and Unibank NS, respectively. 
The Mortgage Act of 1989 required all new mortgage institutions to establish 
themselves as limited liability companies (NS), and further made it possible for old 
2  This is in contrast to specialised mortgage credit institutions which only finance property in special 
sectors. Unity mortgage credit institutions are allowed to provide loans for all purposes and for all 
categories of  property. 
3  Loan ceiling is defined as the maximum percentage of the total value of a building which may be 
mortgaged. Lending limit is defined as the maximum percentage of the costs for a given purpose that 
may be mortgaged (Danske Securities, 1992). 
9 institutions to be converted into limited liability companies. All mortgage credit 
institutions in Denmark must be approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs who 
was  granted the  mortgage credit area as  resort in  the  latest amendment to  the 
Mortgage Credit Act (1992). 




1 Realkredit Danmark 37.3 % 
2 Unitkredit 0.6 % 
3 Nykredit 42.2 % 
4 Total kredit 1.8 % 
5 BRFkredit 16.2 % 
6 Danske kredit 0.8 % 
Source: Realkreditradet. 
Figure  2.1  shows  market  shares  of Danish mortgage  institutions.  Nykredit  and 
Realkredit Danmark currently dominate the Danish mortgage market.  However, 
Unikredit and Danske Kredit were established in  1994, so  it is  still too early to 
determine their eventual shares of the market. 
By the end of 1994, the six mortgage credit institutions in Denmark had an 
outstanding stock of mortgage bonds of DKK 846bn corresponding to a share of 
approximately 54 per cent of the total bond stock. Nevertheless, the entry of some of 
the large Danish commercial banks into the mortgage credit market have resulted in 
decreased market shares for the old mortgage institutions, with Realkredit Danmark 
NS, in particular, losing market share in recent years. The total outstanding stock of 
bonds on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange at the end of 1994 was DKK 1543bn. 
The methods applied by the mortgage credit institutions today are basically the 
same as those introduced in the first Mortgage Credit Act of 1850. Mortgage credit 
institutions act as intermediaries between borrower and lender. This gives mortgage 
credit institutions the right to provide mortgage loans backed by bonds offered for 
public subscription. 
Although  the  stock  of mortgage  bonds  listed  on  the  Copenhagen  Stock 
Exchange is relatively large compared to the size of the economy, a daily DKK 8bn 
10 turnover mortgage bonds of makes them highly liquid papers. Among the Danish 
mortgage credit institutions, only few are rated by Standard & Poor and Moody's. 
Those institutions with credit ratings are listed in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1.  Credit rating 
Nykredit AJS 
BRFkredit AJS 
Standard & Poor 
A2 
Not rated 




In addition to the normal mortgage bonds issued by all the mortgage institutions, the 
CSE and some institutions offer various derivative products based on mortgage 
bonds. Their purpose is to provide opportunities for hedging Danish mortgage bonds. 
Forward contracts have also existed for long time. Since 1988, futures and options 
contracts have been offered officially on the CSE with mortgage bonds as underlying 
assets. This has increased the interest of investors in Danish mortgage bonds. 
2.1.3  Mortgage credit in Denmark 
In practice, mortgage credit in Denmark is provided in the following way. A person 
who wants to purchase property in Denmark requests a mortgage loan from any of 
the organised mortgage institutions. Mortgage credit institutions are then obliged to 
evaluate the property according to the principle that the valuation should not exceed 
the cash market value of the property under normal conditions.4 In principle loans are 
granted as liquid mortgage bonds. In practice, however, the mortgage institution pays 
the borrower the loan sum in cash and sells the mortgage bonds on the behalf of the 
borrower on the CSE at actual price. 
All lending by mortgage credit institutions is subject to legislation which places 
requirements on the security offered, its lifetime and the repayment profile. Mortgage 
institutions are allowed to grant loans up to 80 per cent of the valuation basis of new 
owner-occupied  property  for  all-year  habitation  to  finance  its  purchase  or 
construction, while the rest must be financed elsewhere.5 The maximum maturity of 
these loans is 30 years. Private rental housing, on the other hand, is also subject to a 
lending limit of 80 per cent. In contrast to owner-occupied homes, these loans have 
maturities of up to 50 years (Realkreditn'idet 1994). 
The mortgage credit institutions raise funds for lending by issuing mortgage 
bonds at the same time as they grant a loan. These bonds are listed on the CSE. Each 
time a mortgage institution grants a loan, it issues a number of bonds corresponding 
to the loan with the same repayment profile and lifetime, according to the principle 
4  Price fluctuations should be taken into account by the evaluators when evaluating property during 
booms and recessions.  . 
5  The last 20 per cent is typically financed by a bank loan if the borrower does not have these funds 
already. 
11 ofbalance.6 These bonds are sold on the market by the issuing mortgage institution 
on behalf of the borrower, and the funds obtained are given to the borrower. 
Figure 2.2.  The mortgage credit system in Denmark 
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Note: Bold lines represent the flows in principle; thin lines represent the 
flows in practice. 
Source: Nordic Mortgage Council. 
In principle (bold lines), a borrower granted a mortgage loan receives the loan in 
bonds issued by the mortgage credit institution. The borrower sells the bonds on the 
bond market to an investor and receives cash. In practice (thin lines), however, a 
borrower granted a mortgage loan receives a cash amount from the mortgage credit 
institution corresponding to the value of the bonds in the bond market. The mortgage 
credit institution sells the bonds to the investor and obtains cash to pay the borrower. 
All transactions occure simultaneously. 
2.1.4  Loan types 
Loans can be granted either as cash loans or as bond loans. A cash loan means that 
the borrower receives a principal exactly matching the loan amount in cash to which 
the borrower is entitled on the basis of the value of property, no matter the market 
value ofthe underlying bonds. Alternatively, the borrower can be granted a bond loan 
with a nominal value corresponding to the principal, but where the market value (real 
value) can vary. The main difference between these two loan types is that, for cash 
loans, the interest on the debt is unknown until the bonds are sold because the 
amount of bonds needed is unknown, whereas for bond loans, the cash amount that 
the borrower receives is unknown until the bonds are sold because the value of the 
bonds vary, but the interest payments on the debt is fixed. 
Mortgage institutions typically offer the borrower the choice of three types of 
loans; fixed-interest loans, variable-interest loans and index-linked loans. Fixed-
6  The principle of  balance is described in section 3.1.5. 
12 interest loans are most common. They are offered with an amortisation schedule 
following either an annuity, bullet or serial principle. Payments vary between two 
and four annual payments, and can be either callable or non-callable. Variable-
interest loans (floating-rate loans) are either bullet or annuity loans, for which~the 
coupon for each interest payment is calculated by the CSE as the average yield on a 
daily basis during three months, three months and 20 days before the next interest-
payment date. Variable-interest loans are subject to four interest payments annually. 
Finally,  index-linked loans,  only issued since  1982,  are  created by linking the 
principal to a debtor index and the outstanding debt to a creditor index.7 Amortisation 
of index-linked loans is based on the serial principle and are subject to two annual 
payments, except the very first instalment payment. Index-linked loans are typically 
non-callable. 
Mortgage institutions offer three types of amortisation. The most common type, 
annuity loans are structured as follows: The borrower pays an instalment that remains the 
same during the lifetime of  the loan, implying that the interest share of the instalment is 
continuously declining while the instalment of  the principal is increasing. A second type, 
serial loans, involve repayment of the principal in equal instalments during the lifetime 
of  the loan, but interest payment gradually falls, reducing the service payment. Finally, 
there are bullet loans, where only the interest is paid during the entire lifetime of  the loan, 
and the loan is entirely redeemed at maturity. 
2.1.5  Bonds 
Mortgage institutions normally sell bonds on behalf of the borrower in the primary 
market on the  CSE. All mortgage bonds issued by Danish mortgage institutions are 
listed on the CSE's secondary market. The number of  bonds series in circulation on 
CSE is relatively large compared to the value of  the outstanding bond stock. This is 
mainly due to the large number of mortgage institutions and the previous tendency of 
these institutions to issue a number of identical bond series. Many older series are 
relatively small, as their liquidity is rather low. This creates problems for the stock 
exchange.  Nevertheless,  the  reduction  of the  number  of institutions  after  the 
Mortgage Credit Reform of 1970 and loan conversion is beginning to have an effect 
on the market. This development, however, is threatened by the introduction of 'mix 
loans' , which demand the issuing of two bond series for financing a loan (Danske 
Securities 1994). 
Mortgage bonds are normally issued as freely negotiable bearer instruments that 




7  Index-linked loans in Denmark are based on the net retail price index and several debtor indices 
based on net retail price index and average hourly earnings of wage earners in manufacturing and 
construction. 
8  For a more details on the Danish mortgage bonds, see Realkreditradet (1994), Danske Securities 
(1992) or Realkredit Danmark (1994A). 
13 These correspond to the underlying loans granted by the issuing mortgage institution. 
Fixed-rate bonds are the most common category of bonds on the CSE, they are 
defined as  bonds bearing  a  fixed  nominal  rate  of interest  and  an  amortisation 
following  either  annuity,  serial  or bullet principle.  Repayment normally  varies 
between two and four payments annually depending on the principle of amortisation. 
Fixed-rate bonds are issued with maturities of 10, 20 and 30 years, depending on the 
underlying mortgage loan. They can be callable or non-callable. Callable bonds can 
be redeemed by the borrower any time at par and they currently dominate the market 
at the CSE, representing over 90 per cent of the total outstanding mortgage bond 
stock. 
Index-linked bonds are a relatively new way of issuing debt on the CSE. Since 
their introduction in 1982 index-linked bonds have gained popularity. Today they are 
the  second  largest  bond  instrument.  They  have  two  annual  payments  with  a 
repayment schedule before indexation  following  either annuity,  serial  or bullet 
principle. A special feature of index-linked bonds is that there is no instalment on the 
first payment date. Indexation is done by linking the principal to a debtor index and 
the outstanding debt to a creditor index. The creditor index is based on the net retail 
price index recorded by Denmarks Statistics, while the debtor indices normally are 
based on net retail prices and hourly earnings in manufacturing and construction.9 
Finally, the introduction of a real interest rate tax in 1984 boosted the popularity of 
index-linked bonds among pension and life-insurance funds because index-linked 
bonds were tax exempt. This created a strong demand for them and influenced the 
bond price. 
Variable-rate bonds are characterized by a floating interest rate, ie. the coupon 
for an interest-payment date is calculated as the daily average yield the three months 
ending, three months and 20 days before interest payment due date. 
Mortgage bonds based on an annuity or serial principle are subject to a drawing 
at each interest-payment, after which some bonds will be redeemed at par.  The 
borrowers' repayments are pooled and bonds are drawn by lottery. Mortgage bonds 
can be either callable or non-callable depending on the status of  the underlying loan. 
Callable mortgage bonds can be drawn extraordinarily, when the borrower is calling 
to  redeem the underlying loan at par prematurely.  Thus in addition to ordinary 
drawings, extraordinary drawings can take place depending on the borrower. When 
a bond has been drawn the owner is informed and the bond can no longer be traded 
on the market. Premature redemption of a bond is dependent on several factors lO: 
"A downward call" is used when the interest rate has declined and the borrower 
repays a high-interest loan at par by obtaining a new loan at the new, lower 
interest rate level. 
"An upward call" is used when the interest rate has increased and the borrower 
repays low-interest loans by selling bonds with a higher coupon rate, thereby 
reducing the remaining cash debt and bond debt.  11 
9  For further details on the construction of creditor and debtor indices, see Danske Securities (1992). 
10  Economic reasons for premature redemption are described in detail in Nykredit (1995) and Danske 
Securities (1992). 
11  Because bonds are sold at a value above par, fewer bonds are needed to finance loan conversion. 
14 "A horizontal call" is used when a cash loan is refinanced by a another cash loan 
having the same characteristics. The result is that the remaining cash debt falls 
and the cash rate increases. 
"Refinancing and extension" is  used when the borrower wishes -to  change- the 
characteristics of the loan, eg the maturity, principle, amortisation or type of  loan. 
When purchasing a callable mortgage bond investors are faced with the risk that the 
borrower will redeem the bond prematurely at face value using any of the above 
types of  redemption.  Redemption is not always in the interest of the investor, hence 
the investor demands a risk premium in compensation for the possible loss he might 
face from premature repayment. 
Figure 2.3.  Bonds in circulation on the CSE by holder, ultimo 1994 
1 Financial sector 47,2 % 
2 Non-financial sector 9,8 % 
3 Foreign 13,6 % 
4 Household sector 11,3 % 
5 Public sector 18,1 % 
Source: Denmarks Statistics. 
Note: Nominal value. 
Figure 2.3 shows that the domestic financial sector is the main holder of the bond 
stock in circulation. The Danish financial sector held almost half of the total bond 
stock at the end of 1994, whereas the domestic private sector - surprisingly - only 
held 11 per cent. Even foreign investors hold a greater share of  Danish bonds than the 
household sector. However, the above figure also includes government benchmark 
bonds, which are attractive particularly to foreign governmental and institutional 
investors. 
Mortgage bonds issued by Danish mortgage institutions are not backed by any 
government guarantee. Hence, because the government is often considered more 
credible than private individuals or companies, these will have to pay a risk premium 
for the additional risk of default of mortgage bonds compared to government bonds. 
15 2.1.6  The legal framework 
Mortgage activities in Denmark are subject to the Danish Mortgage Credit Act. The 
Act contains  rules  governing  the  activities  of-mortgage  institutions.  Mortgage 
activities are defined as the granting of loans against a registered mortgage on real 
property where the provision of capital takes place through the issuing of  bonds. 
The mortgage system is founded upon the complete registration of all land and 
property in Denmark. All land is registered by the Danish Ministry of Housing and 
Building, and an identifying Title Number is  attached to each piece of land.  83 
registration offices, corresponding to the number of judiciary districts, register all 
property in Denmark, including all legal transactions concerning the property. Thus, 
registration is a constitutive act which completes the mortgage process. The Danish 
system ensures that ownership and encumbrances on each individual property are 
easily detected, and that such information is publicly available. The registration of 
land makes valuation of  property possible. This is a  necessary requisite for efficient 
functioning of the loan granting system of mortgage credit institutions. 
Mortgage  Credit Institutions  are  obliged to  follow  the  rules  given  by the 
Ministry  of Economic  Affairs,  also  approves  these  institutions.  However,  the 
implementation of the Single European Market into Danish legislation has also 
affected mortgage credit law. First, new mortgage credit institutions were allowed to 
set  up  as  public  limited  companies  and  mortgage  institutions  organized  as 
associations were allowed to convert themselves public limited companies. Second, 
the definition of an institution's capital base and the risk weighting of  its assets were 
changed so that a mortgage institution's capital base must equal at least 8 per cent of 
its risk-weighted assets. 
All Danish mortgage credit institutions are subject to supervision of  the Danish 
Financial Supervision Authority, which in turn, supervises the evaluation of  property, 
maintains the principle of  balance, and audits institutions to check whether they have 
conducted business according to the regulations laid out in the Mortgage Credit Act. 
During the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s Danish tax law strongly supported the 
mortgage credit system. Borrowers could deduct interest expenses from their income 
tax at their marginal tax rate. This advantage was significantly reduced in 1987. At 
present, the maximum tax deduction is 50% of all interest expenses, which is still 
high.  The tax deductibility of interest expenses can be regarded as  an  indirect 
government subsidy to property owners in Denmark. 
2.1.7  Security in the system 
The Danish mortgage credit system is designed with the primary objective of security 
and credibility of the system and the bonds, without resort to government guarantees. 
Basically, all mortgage loans are backed by mortgages on the real property on which 
they are obtained. Mortgage loans cannot be obtained without the necessary collateral 
in real property, the objective valuation of this property prior to mortgaging, and 
16 overcollateralisation which is the foundation of  the mortgage system.  12 It is important 
here to point out that mortgage loans are attached to buildings, not persons. Hence, 
debt is  typically taken over by the buyer of a  given property with a change in 
ownership. 
Furthermore, borrowers are subject to the rules of  joint and several liabilities 
within each bond series, ie a collective liability between borrowers. In practice, this 
has been applied for all bond series within each mortgage credit institution since 
1981. This implies that the liabilities of a single insolvent bond series might be 
transferred to other solvent bond series within a mortgage credit institution if the 
mortgage credit institution cannot meet its obligations. Thus borrower liability is not 
only extended toward the mortgage credit institution, but also to the bond series. 
However, joint and several liabilities may only be exercised for the benefit of the 
investors (Danske Securities 1992). Moreover, joint and several liabilities of the 
borrower only extend to the property mortgaged so the borrower cannot face  a 
personal bankruptcy.  To cover joint and  several  liabilities,  all  mortgage  credit 
institutions have established reserve funds  according to the law, into which all 
borrowers are obliged to contribute. The legislation governing the mortgage credit 
market in Denmark therefore seeks to protect investors by focusing on the following 
three areas: 
Regulation concerning borrowing limits, maturities and repayment profiles 
The principle of  balance, which requires balance between payment flows for each 
loan and the underlying bonds issued in connection with the granting of the loan. 
Preferential treatment of investors in case of  bankruptcy, implying that joint and 
several liability only can be exercised for the benefit of bondholders. 
Until 1989, the principle of balance was part of the Mortgage Credit Act. However, 
harmonisation  to  EU rules  has  resulted  in  the  abolition  of this  rule  from  the 
legislation. Danish tax legislation still favours the symmetrical fiscal handling of 
mortgage loans according to the strict principle of balance. It also requires balance 
between redemption commitments for the loan and the underlying bonds. The result 
is that mortgage credit institutions are not subject to interest rate losses stemming 
from interest rate changes.  l3 
2.2  Sweden 
In Sweden, mortgage credit has also played a significant role in the financing of 
housing. The tradition of mortgage credit in Sweden dates back to the last century 
with the establishment of  the first mortgage credit institution. The Swedish mortgage 
system has been traditionally characterized by centralization and a surprisingly strong 
degree of control by the government given the absence of specific legislation. 
12  Valuation of property is done by  a special staff of evaluators appointed by  mortgage credit 
institutions. These evaluators are required to possess special knowledge of the local property market 
in which they are practising. 
13  For a more detailed description ofthe principle of  balance, see Nordic Mortgage Council (1993), 
Nykredit (1995) or Realkredit Danmark (1994A). 
17 2.2.1  History 
Sweden's first mortgage credit institution was established in 1836. From then until 
1861,  nine additional mortgage institutions were established. In 1861,  SVefiges 
Allmanna Hypoteksbank was created. Its purpose was to create a common lending 
institution for  the  ten existing  mortgage  institutions  (Nordic  Mortgage  Council 
1993). Mortgage institutions serving towns in Sweden with finance were formed in 
the 1860s. This was the foundation of a centralized mortgage institution network 
matching the system already existing.  The centralization focused on a common 
lending institution, primarily directed toward the Swedish agricultural sector. With 
the  establishment  of  Sveriges  Stadshypotekskassa  in  1909  by  the  Swedish 
government, housing finance started to broaden its focus. The entire housing finance 
system was reorganized into a central system with twenty mortgage institutions 
served by Sveriges Stadshypotekskassa. 
The reform of the  Swedish Mortgage  Credit  Act  in  1960  resulted  in  the 
establishment of private mortgage credit institutions in the legal form of public 
limited companies  (AB).14  The new  institutions  were essentially subsidiaries of 
Swedish commercial banks entering the mortgage market to expand their business. 
The reform brought increased competition to the Swedish mortgage system. 
2.2.2  Institutions 
The Swedish mortgage credit market was quite centralised until the reform in 1960. 
Stadshypotek, owned by the Swedish government, acted as an umbrella organisation 
under which 20 local mortgage credit institutions operated in larger cities and towns 
throughout Sweden (Nordic Mortgage council 1993). It was the central organisation 
responsible for raising funds granted as mortgage credit for housing finance by the 
local subsidiaries. 
These institutions still provide mortgage credit for housing finance in cities and 
towns in Sweden. Mortgage credit for financing the Swedish agricultural sector was 
mainly provided by Sveriges  Allmanna Hypoteksbank,  which in  principle  was 
organised in the  same way  as  Stadshypotek.  However,  in  1994, both Sveriges 
Allmanna Hypoteksbank and Stadshypotek were transformed into public limited 
companies, with most shares becoming tradable on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
(SSE). 
The reform of 1960 granted the universal right to establish mortgage credit 
institutions in Sweden. 
This right was mainly exercised by domestic commercial banks, allowing them 
to expand into a part of the financial market that had traditionally been a public 
monopoly. At present, seven mortgage credit institutions provide mortgage credit for 
housing financing in Sweden:  15 
14  Mortgage credit institutions established in the last century were all created as associations. 
15  Sveriges Allmanna Hypoteksbank is not mentioned here because it provides mortgage credit to the 
agricultural sector, some of that credit is for productive investments. 
18 Stadshypotek AB 
Spintab AB 
Statens Bostadsaktiebolag AB (SBAB) 
Handelsbanken Hypotek AB 
Nordbanken Hypotek/Kredit AB 
S-E-banken BoLan AB 
Foreningsbanken Kredit AB 
Of  the above mentioned institutions, Stadshypotek AB is clearly the largest measured 
in terms of market share at the end of 1994. Figure 2.4, shows that the Swedish 
mortgage credit market is clearly highly concentrated. The three largest institutions 
collectively held a market share of70 per cent in 1994 (Stadshypotek AB 1994). The 
degree of concentration in the Swedish mortgage credit market has been increasing 
since the beginning of the 1990s, and this development is expected to continue as 
Stadshypotek has been transformed into a public limited company with no geographi-
callimitations within Sweden. 
Figure 2.4.  Market shares of Swedish mortgage credit institutions, 
ultimo 1994 
5 
1 Statshypotek 32 % 
2 Spintap 24 % 
3SBAB 14% 
4 Handelsbanken Hypotek 10 % 
5 Nodbanken Hypotek / kredit 9 % 
6 S-B-Banken BoUm 8 % 
7 Foreningsbanken Kredit 3 % 
Source: Stadshypotek AB (1994). 
Most of the credit institutions  granted the right to  provide mortgage credit are 
subsidiaries of a larger financial corporation, so developments in Sweden clearly 
point toward further mergers between the remaining mortgage credit institutions and 
other financial institutions. 
Swedish  mortgage  credit  activities  are  regulated  by  the  Law  on  Credit 
Companies,  which  also  regulates  the  activities  of commercial banks  and  other 
companies providing credit. The law was incorporated into the Swedish legislation 
19 together with the Swedish parliaments ratification of the EEA agreement (Nordic 
Mortgage Council  1993). However, both Sveriges Allmanna Hypoteksbank and 
Stadshypotek are regulated by two additional laws enacted in  1992, containing 
specific legislation on the transformation of  both state-owned-institutions into public 
limited companies.  16 
Interestingly,  Sweden defines  no  specific requirements  for  mortgage credit 
institutions.17  In  practice, of course,  financial  institutions cannot be established 
without a special license obtained from the government. These licences are granted 
by the Swedish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA)  (Nordic Mortgage Council 
1993). Mortgage credit institutions are subject to supervision by the FSA, which is 
under the Ministry of  Finance. The FSA also has the right to confiscate the business 
license of any credit institution that is not operating according to the law (Nordic 
Mortgage Council 1993). Lately, the legislation concerning credit institutions has 
been harmonized to fulfill current EU criteria, under which credit institutions in 
Sweden are obliged to fulfill the minimum capital requirement of 8 per cent. 
Bonds  issued  by  mortgage  credit  institutions  in  Sweden  are  not  "name 
protected", so in principle, these bonds are like all  other bonds offered on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange.  18 Several of  the Swedish mortgage institutions are rated 
by Standard & Poor and Moody's with respect to outstanding bond series.19 
2.2.3  Mortgage credit in Sweden 
In Sweden, construction and purchase of homes is  primarily financed by credit 
institutions specialized in this area. Home financing in Sweden is done using either 
Stadshypotek or one of the private credit institutions (the result of the credit reform 
of 1960). In financing by Stadshypotek AB, the borrower requests a loan from one of 
the 20 local institutions of  the organisation. The local subsidiary evaluates the given 
property which the borrower wishes to purchase and use as mortgage for the loan. 
The evaluation of  the mortgage is done in accordance with the rules of  the particular 
credit institution, and the maximum loan limit is 70 or 85 per cent of the valuation 
depending on the institution. 
Loans granted by Swedish credit institutions are given as nominal cash loans, 
and their maturity is typically 20 years.20 Nevertheless, since the principle of  balance 
determines the conditions between borrowing and lending, loans typically have a 
fixed interest rate for a shorter determined period, often five years. The reason for 
16  Legislation on Sveriges Allmanna Hypoteksbank and Stadshypotek is contained in laws no. 700 and 
701. 
17  Mortgage credit institutions are subject to the same requirements as all other credit institutions in 
Sweden. 
18  Mortgage bonds are "name protected" if they have a preferential right to use the name mortgage 
bonds. 
19  This rating, however, changes frequently. The current rating can be obtained by contacting the 
respective institutions. 
20  Cash loan is here defined as in section 3.1.4. 
20 this short period of  fixed interest rate is that the underlying bonds have a maturity of 
typically five years. Hence, in order to fulfill the principle of  balance,  loans can only 
have fixed interest for the maturity of the underlying bonds. In recent years, loans 
with variable interest rates have also gained popularity. This.is probably only a 
temporary phenomenon caused by the high and volatile interest rates. 
As an alternative to Stadshypotek AB, individuals in Sweden can finance their 
homes by applying for a mortgage credit from one of  the private (often bank·owned) 
mortgage institutions in Sweden. In this way individuals normally apply for the loan 
at their local bank. The branch office sends the application to the mortgage credit 
department which grants the loan and issues the bonds. This system somewhat 
resembles the system in Denmark, except that the bank branch offices are the ones 
involved in the direct contact with customers.21 












Source: Nordic Mortgage Council (1993). 
Investor 
Amortization of  housing loans is not regulated by any specific law, though loans with 
the normal amortization principles are often offered. Loans were previously always 
granted as annuity loans. Recently, however, Swedish credit institutions have begun 
to offer loans following the serial and bullet principles.22 
The government previously contributed to the construction of new residences by 
subsidizing interest payments. Today, this system of subsidizing is being phased out 
over a  period of ten years  (Nordic Mortgage Council  1993).  Instead,  Swedish 
institutions can now grant additional loans up to 30 per cent of  the lending limit for 
a new or renovated residence. These loans are backed by a government guarantee, 
granted by Statens bostadskreditnamnd (BKN) (Nordic Mortgage Council 1993). 
21  For banks it is also easier to retain customers if all types of financial products can be provided 
within the bank. 
22  For a definition and description of  these different types of  amortisation principles, see section 3.1.4. 
21 2.2.4  The bond market 
Swedish bonds are issued as bearer bonds, registered in the name of the owner in the 
Swedish Securities Centre (VPC). The terms of the bonds are solely determined by 
the issuing credit institution, which is also fully responsible for emission of the 
bonds. In Sweden, credit institutions typically issue bonds with a fixed interest rate 
and a relative short maturity of 2 to 5 years without instalments, ie bullet loans. 
Figure 2.6.  Bonds in circulation, ultimo September 1994 
6 
1 Commercial banks 11,4 % 
2 Pension funds 21.3 % 
3 Other 2.7 % 
4 Foreign 31.1 % 
5 Households 5.3 % 
6 Non-financial companies 11,9 % 
7 Insurance companies 16.3 % 
Source: Statistiska Centralbyran. 
As can be seen from the Figure 2.6,  foreign  investors are  the main holders of 
Swedish bonds.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that the main part of the bonds held 
by foreign investors are government bonds also included in Figure 2.6.  Among 
Swedish investors, pension funds are clearly the largest bond holders and among the 
main holders of mortgage backed bonds. Swedish commercial banks, including the 
central bank, have the second largest share of outstanding bonds. The share of  bonds 
held by households is surprisingly small. 
While legislation implicitly says that all bonds should be backed by a mortgage 
of equivalent value, but there is no direct connection between the individual loan and 
the individual bond, rather joint and several liability among the borrowers secures the 
bonds. However, bond investors are not granted any preferential claims by law in the 
event of bankruptcy of the credit institution. In Sweden, mortgage credit bonds are 
not granted the right by law to a special name. Therefore, the possibility of separating 
out mortgage bonds is limited. Anyhow, the issuer's name is protected by law, and 
thus mortgage bonds can be identified by knowing the name of  the institution issuing 
mortgage bonds for housing finance. 
22 Emission of new bonds normally includes publication of  a prospectus providing 
detailed information about the new bond series. The official approval from the FSA 
and the Stockholm Stock Exchange are also included in the prospectus. Recently, 
certain larger institutions,  eg Stadshypotek AB  have started to issue benchmark 
loans with larger volume, while having fewer new emissions. Such benchmark loans 
are typically issued approximately every 9 months. The larger volume of  these new 
loans makes them more liquid on the secondary market (Stadshypotek AB 1994). 
Some credit institutions in Sweden have also started to issue mortgage backed 
bonds  outside  Sweden.  This  trend  has  grown  significantly  as  it  has  become 
increasingly difficult to raise the necessary funding on the Swedish bond markets due 
to stiff competition and massive borrowing by the government which has drained the 
markets for capital. 
2.2.5  The legal framework 
In Sweden, all credit market legislation in recent years has been harmonized to meet 
EU legislation. The main law regulating the Swedish market for housing finance is 
the Law on Credit Market Companies, a general law regulating all credit institutions 
in Sweden. Nonetheless, the two former public institutions are regulated by special 
laws concerning their establishment and business.23 
The issuing of  bonds on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is regulated by the Law 
on Debt Letters of 1936.24 The law defines the rules for emission of bonds on the 
SSE,  the  information  required  and  the  registration  of bonds.  Tax  legislation 
concerning interest deduction has been changed in the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
upper limit of  tax deductions of  interest expenses is 30 per cent, and only 70 per cent 
of the deductible interest expenses above SEK 100000 are tax-deductible?5 
2.2.6  Security 
In Sweden, all loans are granted against a mortgage on real property whose value 
should be at least equivalent to  that of the corresponding loan.  The property is 
evaluated by special evaluators. These evaluators are either directly employed by the 
credit institutions or at least approved by them. However, no law implicitly defines 
the criteria of the valuation, hence, overpricing is possible. In Sweden, mortgage 
loans  are  implicitly attached to  the property they  are  financing,  but this  is  not 
explicitly stated in the Swedish law. 
From the investors point of  view, the Swedish system of mortgage-backed bonds 
is relatively unsecured. Borrowers who obtain loans from Swedish mortgage have 
joint and several liability for  serving the bond debt within the credit institution. 
However, in case of simultaneous default by many borrowers in a single institution, 
23  As mentioned above, Stadshypotek and Sveriges Allmanna Hypoteksbank are regulated by law no. 
701 and 700. 
24  "Lag om Skuldebrev", 1936. 
25  Tax rules from 1992. 
23 bondholders are not favoured by law over other creditors. In practice, the government 
has intervened in the market and bailed out credit institutions that suffered serious 
loan losses. However, the government guarentee will end by 1 July 1996. 
In addition,  mortgage  credit institutions  are  obliged to  meet  the-~solvency . 
requirement of 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets  as  defined in EU regulations. 
Finally, it can be argued that the lending limit serves as a security to investors, since 
borrowers are generally not allowed to obtain debt exceeding 70 per cent of the 
property value without government guarantee. 
Credit institutions issuing bonds in Sweden are obliged to follow the principle 
of balance. In this way, credit institutions are not faced with interest rate risk. The 
only risk26 is the risk of default by the borrowers. 
A  relatively  new  form  of security  for  the  investors  is  to  hedge  against 
unfavourable price or interest changes. This can be done using options and futures. 
The Stockholm Option Market (OM) allows the purchase of options and forward 
contracts against almost any underlying Swedish bond traded on the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange. 
While raising funds abroad has recently become popular, it can be a dangerous 
game for both credit institutions and borrowers. Credit institutions face exchange-
rate risk which they cannot pass on directly to their borrowers. If  they did, borrowers 
would face interest-rate risk of another country. 
2.3  The United States of America 
Until the  1970s,  the US  housing loan system was  relatively similar to  several 
European arrangements. Credit institutions held housing loans on their own balance 
sheets. Since then, the system has been entirely restructured. Like the US financial 
market in general, the entire mortgage bond system is far more sophisticated than in 
Scandinavia. Most changes are the result of  financial innovation rather than changes 
in the legislation. 
At present, many different institution categories are involved in the process of 
granting and financing a typical home loan. The originator grants it, the securitiser 
acquires the funds in the capital market, and the servicer collects and processes the 
payments. All these three agents have different duties, responsibilities and sources of 
revenue. The system is quite complicated, but it seems to work efficiently. 
2.3.1  Housing loans from the point of view of the debtor 
In the US, home mortgages are normally granted for long periods, with 30 years often 
considered the norm. Mortgage loans can be obtained from credit institutions, mainly 
commercial banks and savings and loan associations (S & Ls). Fixed rate lending has 
been more common than lending at variable interest rates. In the late 1980s, over 
80 % of  borrowers obtained their mortgages as fixed rate loans (Canner & Luckett 
1990). 
26  These are typically sold as contracts with bonds of  certain benchmark loans. 
24 The US tax system has favoured mortgage credit. Borrowers are allowed to 
deduct all interest paid on mortgage loans on their main home or a secondary home 
from their taxable income, provided the loan sum does not exceed the purchase price. 
Furthermore, no capital gain obtained from  the  sale of a principal residence is 
regarded as taxable income (Carron 1991). 
2.3.2  Securitisation in a nutshell 
Under the prevailing securitisation practice applied in the US, the bank or any other 
credit institution acting as the original lender grants the loan to the individual who 
intends to buy a private house. When the loan has been granted, the lender sells its 
creditor rights to a specific institution.  However, from the point of view of the 
original borrower, the terms of the mortgage loan do not undergo any changes. This 
practice, whereby the original lender sells his creditor rights to a third party, is known 
as securitisation. 
Mortgage loans sold by local banks and S & Ls are purchased by institutions 
specialised in financing these acquisitions by issuing bonds. These bonds are known 
as  Mortgage-backed Securities  (MBS).  In most cases,  these are  "pass-through" 
bonds. These bonds are characterised by the following three properties: 
Every home mortgage belongs to one, particular pool, consisting of thousands 
of home loans. 
The pool, in turn, corresponds to one particular bond issue. 
The cash flows received by investors are directly determined by the cash flows 
of  the underlying pool of residential mortgages. (However, in case of  borrower 
default, the bond issuer guarantees the payments to bond holders.) 
Today, most mortgage-backed securities in the US are of this type. The first pass-
through mortgage-backed  securities were issued in 1970. Before their introduction, 
funds for mortgage loans were occasionally borrowed in the capital market, but 
mortgage loans were not pooled, and bond issues were used to finance the operations 
of the credit institution in general. 
In  1975,  the  share  of securitised  mortgage  loans  was  still  as  low  as  4%. 
Securitisation became common in the US  mortgage market in the late 1970s and 
early  1980s,  and  the  turbulent  financial  environment  of the  late  1970s  caused 
fundamental changes in the mortgage market. Nominal money market interest rates 
rose dramatically. It was a time when S & Ls were still obliged by government 
regulations to apply relatively low interest rates to deposits. Hence, depositors found 
it more worthwhile to invest in money market securities than to make deposits in 
banks.  Consequently, the mortgage market had to  turn to the capital market. In 
addition, increased interest rate volatility aggravated  the risk of maturity mismatches 
in the balance sheets of primary financial institutions, making them more willing to 
dispose of  their long-term receivables. In the 1980s  securitisation continued, so that 
today slightly more than 50% of  all home mortgages loans are securitised. According 
to recent estimates, the total outstanding stock of MBSs exceeds USD 1 300 billion, 
and the growth does not seem to have ceased (OECD IT 1995). 
Apparently the securitisation of mortgage loans has been a successful strategy 
for US financial institutions because they have tried to apply it on a large scale. Since 
25 the early 1980s, they have experimented with the securitisation of several other types 
of receivables, such as consumer credit.27 Recently, "repackaging" of securities has 
been introduced;  a  new  security is  created by purchasing  an  existing pool  of 
securities and financing these purchases by issuing bonds (OECD.!I 1995). 
2.3.3  The institutions involved 
2.3.3.1  Originators 
The bank or savings and loan association that originally grants the loan to a borrower 
is referred to as the originator. The role of S & Ls as originators has declined over 
time, and consequently the role of commercial banks has increased (Capozza & 
Order 1992). 
Mortgage loan origination has become a fee-oriented activity. Revenues are to 
a significant extent obtained from fees charged in the lending activity. The potential 
profit on sale of mortgage loans is another possible source of revenue. The activity 
ties up very little capital, but on the other hand, it does not offer a safe and stable 
source of revenue because the demand for securitisable loans is highly sensitive to 
business and interest rate cycles. Another important risk related to this activity is the 
"pipeline" effect, whereby at any given moment the originator has a pool of  loans to 
be sold, and it is possible that interest rates increase while the originator is holding 
a large amount of such loans. If  this happens, the market value of these mortgage 
loans declines. Mortgage loan origination can thus be a highly volatile, risk-bearing 
source of  income for a bank (Gilkeson et al. 1994). 
In the US, it is common among banks to securitise mortgage loans from the 
balance  sheet  and  to  simultaneously  buy  mortgage-backed  securities  in  the 
secondary market. There are several reasons for doing so. For example, in many 
cases MBS  issuers  are  government-backed institutions,  so  swapping these two 
seemingly comparable assets eliminates the default risk, and thereby reduces the 
required  capital  reserves.  In  addition,  the  bank  receives  a  portfolio  that  is 
geographically more diversified than the pool originally collected by the credit 
institution.  However, the sale and repurchase also reduces the total amount of 
revenue because institutions involved in this transaction always charge certain profit 
margins. Hence, this operation may not be reasonable if  adequate capital is not scarce 
and there is no need to lower risk-based capital requirements (Gilkeson et al. 1994). 
Despite securitisation, the share of mortgage-based assets (including MBSs) out of 
total assets has increased in the balance sheets of commercial banks, partly because 
the housing loan system has been gradually taken over by commercial banks as the 
share of S & Ls as  holders of mortgage-backed assets has decreased, and partly 
because risk-based capital guidelines have forced banks to increase their share of 
low-risk assets such as mortgages (Capozza & Order 1992). 
-27 Even credit card receivables have been securitised. 
26 2.3.3.2  Security issuers 
In the  US,  there  are  three  major institutions  acting  as  security issuers.  These 
institutions are often called secondary mortgage institutions. Theiederal government 
has to some extent been involved in the establishment of all of them. In 1993, the 
share of these three major institutions out of the total stock of issued MBSs was 
about 72 %. 
1)  The Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") was established in 
1938  as  a governmental body by an act of Congress. The intention was to 
smooth housing cycles and pass federal subsidies on to mortgage lenders. The 
establishment of this institution was part of New Deal economic policies. For 
most of its history, Fannie Mae has issued ordinary bonds and purchased loans 
guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration from local credit institutions. 
When deposit rate ceilings limited the ability of ordinary S & Ls to collect 
deposits, Fannie Mae maintained its ability to grant new loans by purchasing old 
mortgage loans. However, these activities did not expand significantly in the 
1950s and 1960s because interest rate volatility was rather moderate. Since 
1968, Fannie Mae has been a corporation. It buys mortgage loans from various 
lenders on a regular basis. Many loans purchased are still granted either to low-
income households or persons with special housing needs. Apart from that, the 
company also purchases large quantities of mortgages in under-served areas. 
Currently, Fannie Mae is the largest private issuer of securities in the US. In 
April 1995, its outstanding debt totalled USD 258 billion (Fed Res Bull, Sept 
1995, Statistical Annex). 
2)  The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") is  another 
major securitiser.  From the  very beginning,  S  &  Ls  had a  hostile  attitude 
towards the development of secondary mortgage institutions. However, when 
Fannie Mae was privatised, S & Ls changed their policies and began to plan the 
establishment of  their own institution. In 1970, Freddie Mac was established as 
a secondary mortgage agency. It is owned by regional banks, which in turn are 
owned by S & Ls.  Freddie Mac buys loans from its owners and institutions 
belonging to their reference groups. Financial institutions that have little to do 
with S & Ls are normally unable to sell their mortgage loans to Freddie Mac. 
The mortgage loans securitised are normally guaranteed by the mortgage, but 
not by the government. (Metaxas-Vittas & Vittas). The amount of outstanding 
debt in April 1995 totalled USD 106 billion (Fed Res Bull, Sept 1995, Stat 
Annex). 
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE). 
In practice, this implies that they are privately owned by their shareholders, but they 
enjoy several privileges, such as exemption from state and local taxes, exemption 
from Securities and Exchange Commission registration and state securities laws. In 
addition, these institutions can borrow up to USD 2.25 billion from the US treasury 
an  emergency.28  Their  "Agency  Status"  also  provides  them  with  a  significant 
28  In practice, these institutions are still backed by the federal government, even though they operate 
as private companies. 
27 advantage in the capital market, because it is implicitly understood that the federal 
government would guarantee their debts in case of insolvency. On the other hand, 
these companies do not enjoy the same degree of  freedom and independence as 
normal corporations. The President appoints five members out of 18 to the governing 
board of both institutions. These GSEs not only securitise loans; they also hold 
relatively large portfolios ofMBS themselves. (Weicher 1994) 
3)  The  Government  National  Mortgage  Association  ("Ginnie  Mae")  is  a 
governmental body, although the federal government does not formally provide 
any direct guarantee to its debts. It was separated from Fannie Mae in 1968 to 
continue the policy-related duties of Fannie Mae. It only securitises mortgage 
loans that are guaranteed either by the Federal Housing Administration or by the 
Veterans Administration. The institution issues bonds both domestically and 
internationally. Since the institution purchases government-backed loans only, 
it is to a large extent involved in mortgage loans extended to low- or moderate-
income households. In 1993, about 55 % of securitised loans were granted to 
households with incomes lower than the median of  their respective metropolitan 
statistical areas. The comparable figures were 30 % for Fannie Mae and 29 % 
for Freddie Mac (Canner, Passmore, Cook, Kirsch, McLeod &  Myers). The 
exact amount of  outstanding bonds is not known precisely. 
In addition to these three major institutions, there are  a large number of minor 
competing firms in the business. Mortgage-backed securities have been issued by 
these minor institutions since 1977. In 1993, their share was estimated to be about 
28 % of  the 7.4 million loans sold in the secondary market. These minor institutions 
are often referred to as "private label issuers", although, in practice, most of them 
have close relationships to local, state or federal government. It has been estimated 
that 95 % of all mortgage-backed securities have been issued by institutions that in 
some way are sponsored, backed or administered by governmental bodies (OECD I 
1995). 
Regulations  imposed  by  the  federal  government  have  contributed  to  the 
segmentation  of  the  market  according  to  loan  sizes.  The  Federal  Housing 
Administration (FHA) offers guarantees to mortgage loans granted to first-time home 
buyers. The loans to be guaranteed by the FHA have a dollar-denominated maximum 
ceiling that cannot be exceeded. Because Ginnie Mae does not buy any loans without 
this guarantee, the mortgages purchased by Ginnie Mae cannot exceed this ceiling. 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,  in turn,  are  bound by another government 
regulation, the conforming loan limit. The conforming loan limit sets a maximum 
ceiling for the dollar denomination of  loans, although this limit is significantly higher 
than the ceiling that binds Ginnie Mae. 
Loans  that  exceed both maximum ceilings  ("Jumbo loans")  are  the  most 
important remaining market  segment for loans held by banks or S  &  Ls,  and 
eventually, securitised by private label issuers. It has been argued that the business is 
evolving towards a duopoly situation, whereby the two major GSE, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, will dominate the industry to an increasing extent. Minor issuers will 
be marginalised to specific market niches with little potential for growth (Weicher 
1994). 
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The servicer is the institution that collects interest and principal payments, and then 
passes them on to the securitisation institution. In many cases, themiginal issuer of 
the loans continues as the servicer. From the point of view of the borrower it appears 
that the bank or credit institution continues to collect both principal and interest 
payments  as  if the loan had not been securitised.  However, these payments are 
immediately transferred to the MBS issuer. It  is also possible to pass the rights and 
duties of the servicer on to another institution that takes care of collecting interest 
and principal payments on behalf of the MBS holders (Weicher 1994). 
The servicer is paid. In most cases, the payment is embodied in the profit margin 
between the borrower and the investors. The difference between these interest rates 
may be 25 basis points, which in most cases is significantly more than the costs of 
this activity. Even these servicing contracts are valuable assets, and they have a 
market, ie the contract to service the mortgage loan can be sold to another servicer. 
The costs of servicing one particular mortgage do  not normally depend on the 
outstanding debt; servicing a home loan of USD 10 million does not cost much more 
than  servicing  a  loan  of USD  10  thousand.  Hence,  there  are  significant  scale 
economies associated with this business. (Gilkeson et al. 1994) 
The most important risk element of servicing as a line of business is related to 
prepayments. The borrower is allowed to make repayments before the agreed date. 
Servicing as a business is especially vulnerable to prepayments by mortgagors. When 
a loan is prepaid, servicer rights disappear, so the institution no longer receives 
compensation. 
If servicers fail to satisfy the requirements set by MBS issuers, agencies can 
withdraw the servicing contract. In cases of borrower insolvency, the skills of the 
servicer may be of  paramount importance to holding down the amount of loan losses 
suffered by bond holders. 
2.3.4  Credit risk enhancement 
The default rates of original mortgage loans have been very low, in fact as low as 
four-to-one thousand, even among loans that according to background information 
(such as debtor income, loan to value ratio etc.) belong to the highest risk category. 
As a rule, low-income households and surprisingly, high income households are 
more likely to  default their payments than middle income households (Deng & 
Quigley 1995). Home price declines, unemployment and net emigration explain a 
significant share of defaults at regional level (Case et al.  1995). 
Although each issue  corresponds to  a  given  pool  of securitised loans,  the 
mortgage  institution  guarantees  full  payment  of both  interest  and  principal, 
irrespective of the amount of loan losses suffered by the original pool. Mortgage-
backed securities issued by the three major institutions are given the highest ratings 
both by Moody's and Standard & Poor, ie triple A. The highest- quality rating can 
mainly be explained by the implicit guarantee offered by the federal government; as 
the federal government participates in the administration of these institutions, it is 
also  believed  that  in  case  of insolvency,  the  government  would  take  care  of 
amortising their debts. However, there is no formal agreement concerning this issue, 
and because no such GSE has ever gone bankrupt, there is no historical evidence 
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major institutions are regarded as  so creditworthy that even the Federal Reserve 
System accepts their bonds as collateral. 
With  private  label  securities,  the  problem  of credit  risk-is  much  more 
accentuated. Because the credit risk is recognised to exist, credit rating agencies are 
requested to measure it. The standard practice is to use at least two different rating 
agencies to examine each issue.  Most private label issuers also have relatively high 
credit ratings, although not necessarily triple A. (GEeD IT 1995). 
It  is  also  possible  to  use  various  credit  enhancing  techniques  such  as 
subordinated loans, over-collateralisation, reserve funds and third-party guarantees. 
There is  a specific  insurer category that has  specialised  in  offering third-party 
guarantees, the so-called monoline insurers. Unlike general insurance companies, 
they have only one line of business: they offer bond issuers third-party guarantees for 
a fee.  These firms  have  retained their triple  A ratings,  and  consequently,  their 
guarantees are among the most expensive. The monoline industry originally sprang 
up in the municipal bond market, but it has since become increasingly common also 
among MBS issuers to use their services. In the late 1980s, the monoline industry's 
total exposure almost doubled. In many cases, monoline insurers required first loss 
guarantees from other third parties. In recent years, some of these companies have 
established subsidiaries abroad, but on the whole, the monoline insurance industry is 
still a national particularity ofthe US (Euroweek 1991). 
It is also possible for the originator to sell the pool without credit risks, whereby 
the guarantee is offered by the originating bank. However, in these "with recourse" 
sales, the originator is still obliged to maintain capital reserves to cover expected 
losses, so this arrangement is rare (Gilkeson et al.  1994). 
2.3.5  Prepayments - the main source of uncertainty 
2.3.5.1  The problem 
The most important difference between mortgage-baked securities  and ordinary 
corporate or government bonds is  the risk of early repayment.  The borrower is 
allowed to repay the entire loan or a part of it prematurely. When borrowers make 
such prepayments, the security issuer pays  a certain amount of the principal to 
bondholders. From the point of view of an investor, this option makes MBSs less 
attractive, especially as it is not possible to buy MBS without simultaneously issuing 
these implicit prepayment options. Thus, when  investors evaluate mortgage-backed 
securities  as  an  alternative,  they  have  to  consider  the  likely  amount  of future 
prepayments. 
To make things worse,  prepayments have the built-in  tendency to occur when 
they are least welcome to investors. The most important determinant of prepayments 
seems to be the interest rate level. When cheap refinancing is available, ie when bond 
prices are high, many debtors will take advantage of  the situation by repaying the old 
mortgage loans with new cheaper loans. This causes bondholders serious losses. In 
principle, of  course, it will always be profitable for the debtor to repay the mortgage 
and replace it with another loan whenever the interest rate is lower than the interest 
rate on the old mortgage. However, the prepayment option is not always used when 
it, in principle, is profitable for the debtor and cause the bondholder losses. This may 
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incomplete information, costs related to refinancing and other market imperfections 
(Archer et al.  1995). 
Another important reason for prepayment is relocation. In most cases, when the 
debtor sells the real estate, the mortgage is prepaid. However, in some cases, it is 
possible to pass the loan on to the buyer. This was especially common in the early 
1980s when interest rates were high, and old mortgage loans at low interest rates 
were comparable to valuable assets. There were still no restrictions on such deals. 
Now, relocations normally cause prepayment. (Patruno 1994) 
As borrowers are allowed to make prepayments and the credit risk is in most 
cases rather low, these prepayments are the most important uncertainty element 
involved in MBSs. It has even been argued that the existence of this prepayment risk 
was one of the main reasons why MBSs did not become popular before financial 
innovations made it possible to protect oneself against this risk in the mid-1980s 
(Patruno 1994). 
Financial specialists have tried to develop statistical models that should be able 
to predict the amount of future repayments. In most cases, these models have not 
produced satisfactory forecasts (Patruno 1994). The fact that prepayments are non-
predictable has been extremely important to the development of MBSs. If  it were 
possible to predict prepayments, investors would know the maturity of their MBS 
investments. The special arrangements presented in the following section would be 
of very limited use, and there would be hardly any difference between investing in 
government bonds and MBSs. 
2.3.5.2  How the problem has been handled 
Prepayment risk has  been a major motivations for  several financial  innovations 
within the MBS  field.  In  fact,  it would seem that no  other issue related to  this 
category  of  securities  has  stimulated  investment  bankers'  imagination  to  a 
comparable extent. Now, we shall take a closer look at different ways to handle the 
prepayment risk by dividing  a MBS  issue into different  types  of bonds.  These 
techniques do  not eliminate the prepayment risk,  but, instead, they enable each 
investor to choose the preferred combination of risk and expected return. 
In 1983, the first Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMO) were issued by 
Freddie Mac. In this arrangement, mortgage-backed security issues are divided into 
tranches, coded as A, B, C and so on. When principal repayments take place, first the 
bonds in the tranche A are redeemed, then the bonds in the tranche B, and so on. The 
original 30-year callable securities are transformed into a sequence of instruments 
with differing maturities. Hence, investors can choose which tranche they would like 
to  invest  in,  depending  on  their  preferences  concerning  maturity  and  related 
uncertainty. The tax problems of CMOs were solved in 1986 with the introduction of 
the "Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits" (REMIC). REMICs and CMOs are 
very  similar  and  the  names  are  sometimes  used  interchangeably.  Today,  most 
securitised loans are pooled into REMICs (Carron 1992). 
At present, most CMOs include a Z tranche. Bonds of this category do not 
receive any monetary coupon interest payment. Instead, bond holders receive more 
bonds. When all other tranches have been repaid, the status of the Z tranche changes 
and the bond holders begin to receive both interest and principal repayments as 
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(Carron 1992). 
Some issues include Planned Amortization Class (P AC) bonds. These bonds are 
repaid according to a fixed schedule. The fixed repayment must be met ·beforeany 
principal payments can be made to other tranches. With the exception of extreme 
cases, future principal repayments on a P  AC bond are predictable. The rest of the 
securities of the issue are called companion bonds. The uncertainty related to their 
moment of principal repayment is particularly high. The effective yield on them is 
higher than the return on P  AC bonds whenever interest rates remain stable. In case 
of declining interest rates,  P  AC bonds earn higher capital gains, but companion 
bonds are likely to be called at face value (Carron 1992). 
2.3.6  The market for mortgage-backed securities 
It has been said that the market for mortgage-backed securities is the only USD-
denominated rival to the US Treasury market. Mortgage-backed securities account 
for 27 % of the total stock of fixed-income instruments. 
Even though the default risk related to  most mortgage-backed securities is 
minimal, the yield on these bonds has normally been somewhat higher than the yield 
on government securities. Typically, the difference has been 100-150 basis points. 
There are  mainly two  reasons  for  the  existence of this  spread.  First,  there is  a 
significant risk that a large proportion of  the loans are prepaid whenever interest rates 
are low enough.  When cheaper financing is  available, rational borrowers would 
normally replace old mortgage loans with new loans. Secondly, mortgage-backed 
bonds are significantly less liquid than government bonds. These liquidity problems 
are largely caused by the great variety of issues in circulation. 
In order to avoid liquidity problems, MBS  trading takes place on a To-Be-
Announced (TB A) basis, ie when deals are struck, nothing but the coupon rate and 
the security type are disclosed. The seller can deliver any securities that belong to the 
relatively loosely defined category, such as 8% coupon A tranche loans granted by 
Fannie Mae. Because the issuing institution guarantees the bonds, all bonds issued by 
the same institution belong to the same credit quality category. 
2.4  Summary 
Housing finance based on mortgage credit is a nearly two-hundred-years-old tradition 
in Denmark. Using property as collateral long-term credit is offered to the population 
in general by a well-organised market.  Objective evaluation of the  property by 
experts and over-collateralisation determined by the Mortgage Credit Act is the basic 
security of the  system.  A  limited number of institutions  provide  the  necessary 
mortgage credit cost efficiently through economies of scale. 
Mortgage bonds are traded daily on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The size 
of the national bond market and the credibility of the mortgage bonds makes such 
bonds  attractive  to  investors  and  limits  the  interest  rate  spread  compared  to 
government bonds. However, small bond series tend to make markets less liquid, 
while call-options on a major part of  bonds in circulation increases the interest-rate 
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the government's role is that of  regulator, rather than participant. Defaults have never 
been a serious problem in Denmark. 
The Swedish mortgage credit system was created by the government However, 
competition was introduced into the mortgage credit system through liberalisation in 
1960  and the  privatisation  of public-owned institutions  in  1994.  Many of the 
institutions  established as  a  result of the  liberalisation are  owned by Swedish 
commercial banks. Mortgage loans are long-term loans with interest rates fixed for 
shorter periods (2-5 years). This corresponds to the maturity of the underlying bonds 
which are also short-term. 
Although the government previously had strong control over the mortgage credit 
market, it has been in the absence of specific legislation. Valuation of property in 
Sweden is  done by professionals.  As  no  criteria are  explicitly defined  for  this 
evaluation, overpricing is possible. Thus, while the government does not guarantee 
the  bonds  explicitly,  losses  during  the  last recession  were  so  large  that  the 
government intervened in the market. 
In the US, housing loans have been securitised since the 1970s.  When local 
banks have granted ordinary mortgage loans, they often sell their creditor rights to 
specific secondary institutions. These secondary institutions finance the purchase by 
issuing bonds, mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Each bond issue corresponds to 
a specific pool of mortgages. The underlying loans in a pool are often collected from 
different states. In most cases, these security issues are of the "pass-through" type in 
the sense that the payments received by bond holders are directly determined by the 
payments on the underlying mortgages. 
There are three major secondary institutions. All of them are, in one way or 
another, controlled  by the federal government. In addition, there are several small, 
independent securitisers. 
Loan losses have not been a major problem in the system,  simply because 
overcollateralisation has prevented them from becoming common. When loan losses 
occur, the secondary institution guarantees the receivables of the bond holders. The 
fact that the borrower has the right to repay the loan prematurely makes the MBS less 
attractive. Whenever interest rates are low, the risk of  early repayment increases. This 
problem has been handled relatively successfully by creating a sophisticated system 
where bond holders can affect the likely amount of  repayments by choosing bonds of 
a suitable category. 
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3.1  The private sector 
3.1.1  The present situation 
At the moment, security issues are not widely used as a source of  funding for housing 
loans. Most housing loans are granted within the ordinary banking system. The funds 
are  mainly  collected  as  short-term  deposits  from  the  public,  or as  short-term 
interbank loans. Because of maturity matching policies, banks are not normally 
interested in offering their customers fixed-rate loans. 
In addition to ordinary banks, there is a specific group of financial institutions, 
called hypothec or mortgage banks.  Before the new Credit Institution Act was 
enacted in 1992, there was a specific law concerning such mortgage banks, but today 
they are subject to the same law as ordinary banks. Hence, one could argue that in the 
legal sense, these institutions no more exist as a specific group. However,  financial 
institutions that were regulated by the old Hypothec Bank Act still operate to a large 
extent according to their traditional practices. They grant loans with a low default 
risk, namely loans backed by real estate collateral and loans to the public sector. 
They fund themselves mainly by issuing bonds. Earlier, Finnish mortgage banks had 
special privileges as bond issuers. 
There are five such mortgage banks in Finland. All of  them are relatively small, 
and all are owned by commercial banks. In the business strategies of the major 
banking groups, housing loans belong to the field of operation of ordinary branches, 
not to these specific units. Instead, they grant mortgage-backed loans to the corporate 
sector, especially to investments that are related to real estate. Their business strategy 
is still to remain particularly creditworthy by granting loans with the lowest possible 
risk. (Suomen rahoitusmarkkinat 1995) 
In addition to corporate loans, OKO Mortgage Bank (OKO-investointipankki, 
owned by cooperative banks) grants ordinary housing loans to private individuals. 
The Industrial Bank of Finland (Suomen Teollisuuspankki, owned by Merita) and 
Alands Hypoteksbank (owned by Alandsbanken) do not market housing loans. PSP 
Municipality Bank (PSP-kuntapankki, owned by Postipankki) grants many loans to 
the local government sector,  and it is  also  an important source of funding  for 
investments in rental housing. (Annual Reports for the year 1994) The Finnish Real 
Estate Bank (Suomen kiinteist6pankki),  previously owned by the savings bank 
group,  was taken over in 1995 by a Swedish bank, Svenska Handelsbanken. In 1995, 
it did not issue any new bonds. 
Although the law concerning mortgage banks has been abolished, there is still 
a  specific law concerning mortgage or hypothec associations, credit institutions 
which  are  comparable  to  mortgage  banks.  According  to  the  law,  a  mortgage 
association is owned and controlled by its debtors, and every debtor automatically 
becomes a member of the association. Basically the association is a joint lending 
project of its  members.  Every member has  one vote in the  general  assembly, 
irrespective of  the amount of their outstanding debt. However, a debtor-member who 
has not paid all interest and principal payments has no voting rights. Members are not 
responsible for the debts of the association, nor do they have any right to receive any 
part of the profit of the association. All  loans should normally be backed by real 
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acceptable loan-to-value ratio. A mortgage association must have a license granted 
by the Ministry of  Finance. 
Since 1979, there has only been one mortgage association in.Finland, Suomen 
Hypoteekkiyhdistys. It was established in 1860, making it one of the oldest credit 
institutions in Finland.  Because its balance sheet now barely exceeds FIM 2 billion, 
it is also among the smallest financial institutions. The institution acquires funding 
by issuing bonds and borrowing from banks. Housing loans are its main field of 
activity. Until recently, most of the loans were pegged to long-term rates, but at the 
moment, they are normally pegged to the 12-month interbank rate. 
In  1993,  a  committee  published  its  report  concerning  the  possibilities  to 
securitise housing loans granted by banks. According to the scheme devised, banks 
would have sold their creditor rights on outstanding loans to a specific institution that 
would finance these purchases by issuing bonds. It was concluded that one of the 
main barriers to implementation was related to taxation; it was unclear which tax 
laws would apply (Arvopaperistamistyoryhma 1993). To date, no Finnish bank has 
securitised its housing loans. 
3.1.2  The limited role of mortgage institutions in Finland 
- A historical perspective 
When one studies the history of housing finance in different countries, it is difficult 
not to notice the pronounced differences between Finland and the two other Nordic 
countries covered by our study. Why do hypothec banks have such a small market 
share in Finland, while similar mortgage institutions virtually dominate the market 
in Denmark and in Sweden? Perhaps the present marginal role of mortgage banks in 
the Finnish financial sector can best be explained from a historical perspective. In the 
past, legislation discriminated against Finnish mortgage banks, and although it no 
longer does, the industry has never recovered. 
Before World War I,  Finland had several financial institutions that financed 
themselves by issuing bonds. They played a major role in the financial sector of the 
time.  In 1913,  for  example the  outstanding stock of ordinary loans  granted by 
commercial banks totalled FIM 220 million, a hefty amount by modern standards, 
and the outstanding stock of the two major mortgage institutions totalled FIM 145 
million (Brofeldt 1915). Even though domestic demand for long-maturity bonds was 
weak,  these institutions were  able to  finance  their operations by issuing bonds 
abroad. (Kuustera 1980) 
Many financial institutions did not survive the general crisis of the financial 
sector in the early 1920s. Mortgage banks had, in addition, suffered from serious 
exchange rate losses because of the devaluation of the markka during the World 
War I  (Korpisaari 1922). The boom in the construction sector in the late  1920s 
offered hypothec banks new opportunities, and the industry recovered. In 1929, the 
mortgage institutions  had a market share  of 42  % of all  loans  granted against 
mortgage on real estate in  urban  areas.  This recovery was  temporary.  With the 
depression of the early 1930s, mortgage institutions had to  allow many of their 
customers to restructure interest and principal payments. Because many bond issues 
had been denominated in gold, the devaluation of the Finnish markka caused serious 
exchange rate losses (Kuustera 1980). The income tax reform that favoured bank 
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mortgage  council  1993).  It was  the  first  in  a  series  of legislative  obstacles  to 
operations of mortgage banks. 
After  W  orId  War  IT,  financial  market  regulations  further  hampered.the 
operations of mortgage banks.  The central government imposed restrictions on bond 
issues for about 40 years. During this time, mortgage banks had to have a license for 
all  tax-exempt bond issues. And because the central government was using tax-
exempt bond emissions for its own purposes, such licenses were not granted without 
taking into account the borrowing needs of the central government. Taxable bonds 
issued by mortgage banks were normally held in the portfolios of  parent banks, and 
hypothec banks that were not owned by banks had difficulties finding investors. 
Hence, in order to continue their activities, mortgage banks had to be owned by 
ordinary banks, and these parent companies preferred to keep housing loans on their 
own balance sheets.  Ironically,  mortgage banks  ended up  mainly financing  the 
corporate sector. 
An independent entrant could have tried to conquer its share of the unofficial 
tax-exempt bond issue quota at the cost of its rivals.Acquiring funds  by issuing 
taxable bonds would have been allowed, but because ordinary customer deposit 
accounts were tax-exempt until the late 1980s, the commercial bank could undercut 
market rates. As the tax system favoured certain behaviour, there was no incentive to 
establish independent hypotec banks. 
Since the 1980s, no restrictions on bond issues have existed. The tax treatment 
of bank deposits is  no  longer as  preferential as  it used to be.  Hence,  a private 
mortgage institution that finances itself with bond issues could, in principle, now 
enter the market. In the light of foreign experience, such institutions probably could 
occupy a market niche. For instance, a foreign mortgage credit institution might find 
it reasonable to establish a subsidiary in Finland. 
However,  there  are  still  serious  legal  obstacles  to  the  functioning  of the 
European single market for mortgage loans; the terms of such loans vary across EU 
member countries, there are serious problems related to taxation, in several countries 
there  are  governmental  subsidies  to  home  buyers,  these  subsidies  vary  across 
countries, and so on. (Federation Hypothecaire Europeenne 1996) 
3.2  The public sector 
The public sector has acquired funding for housing purposes with bond issues on a 
much larger scale than the private sector. 
The Government Housing Fund is the central government body that grants 
"Arava" loans, a type of subsidised housing loan. These loans are normally granted 
either to private individuals or to  local governments for the purpose of building, 
purchasing or renovating dwellings. Basically, any institution can be granted an 
Arava loan for rental dwellings, but all rental dwellings built with these loans are 
subject  to  rental  regulation.  Most  of these  loans  have  been  granted  to  local 
governments.  Private individuals can obtain Arava loans  only if their personal 
incomes do not exceed certain limits that depend on the geographic area and the 
number of  children. These limits are adjusted annUally. A couple with two children 
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is close to the median income of  all Finnish wage earners. 
The Government Housing Fund acquires funding in three different ways: 
Redemptions and interest payments on the outstanding loan stock. 
Directly from the central government. 
By issuing bonds. 
Government Housing Fund bonds are of high credit quality because in practice they 
are guaranteed by the central government. In 1994, the total amount of outstanding 
government housing bonds equalled FIM  13.4 billion.  One of these bonds is  a 
benchmark bond, which primary dealers of the government benchmark bond system 
quote on a regular basis. 
In November 1995, the securitisation of  Arava loans was introduced. A specific 
institution, called Fennica Number 1, was registered in Ireland. This company has 
only done one operation ever, a securitisation operation.  The company issued USD-
denominated bonds  and  used  these  funds  to  purchase  creditor rights  to  rental 
dwelling Arava loans. The operation involved two security issues, a A-rated junior 
loan series of USD 350 million, and a AAA-rated senior loan series of USD 13.7 
billion. The Finnish government does not guarantee these bonds. The bonds issued 
by Fennica Number 1 pay a variable interest fixed according to the 6-month LmOR 
rate. Because the rate of interest paid on these loans is lower than the market rate, the 
government pays the institution an annual fee to cover the difference. In addition, the 
institution has made derivative contracts to eliminate the associated exchange rate 
risk and interest rate risk. Fennica Number 1 was registered abroad because it never 
was clarified how Finnish tax authorities would have treated it. 
The Government Housing Fund has plans to securitise more housing loans in the 
future.  It  would be possible to acquire funding by issuing traditional housing bonds, 
but in this case securitisation has been chosen as  a way to limit the growth of 
government debt. On the other hand, local governments are the debtor in most rental 
housing Arava loans, so this operation as an alternative to ordinary housing bond 
emissions will have little impact on public  sector gross  debt as  defined in the 
Maastricht treaty.  From the  point of view of private bond holders,  the  central 
government is no longer the debtor; from the point of view of Fennica Number 1, 
local governments are. As Fennica Number 1 is classified in the category of private 
institutions, its receivables from a local government belong to the gross public debt. 
In 1993, a  new credit institution was established as a joint project of about 200 
municipalities. The new company, Kuntien Asuntoluotto Oy, finances public sector 
housing investments only. Both construction of  new dwellings and renovation of  old 
ones can be financed with these funds. As the company finances the public sector 
only, and because many of the loans granted by it are both guaranteed by the central 
government and backed by real estate mortgage, the company belongs to the highest 
possible credit rating category. However, it has not been rated by any credit rating 
agency. The first bond issue, consisting of lO-year bullet bonds worth FIM 150 
million, took place in December 1993 (TalouseHima 40/1993). The first loan, FIM 
160  million,  was  granted  to  the  city  of Helsinki  in  January  1994.  The  local 
government authorities invested these funds in building new rental dwellings in 
Helsinki.  Each bond issued by  Kuntien  Asuntoluotto  is  identical  to  a  specific 
government benchmark loan: the coupon rate, the maturity date and all other details 
37 are  completely identical.  However,  the effective yield is  somewhat higher.  For 
instance, in the issue of  January 1995, the difference was 48 basis points. When these 
bonds are auctioned, investors are asked to present their offers as the effective yield 
margin to the yield of the respective benchmark bond (Startel News). The existence 
of this spread in the effective yields can probably be explained to a large extent with 
the liquidity problems related to it.  In addition, financial institutions may prefer 
government benchmark bonds because they are eligible for repurchase agreements 
with the central bank. 
38 4  Discussion 
Whatever the mortgage-bond system is, it cannot.provide loans atattractive interest 
rates if it cannot collect funds  itself at low cost.  The spread over the yield on 
government benchmark bonds depends on: 
The default risk. 
The prepayment risk. 
The liquidity premium. 
The default risk has so far been handled successfully by over-collateralisation at least 
in Denmark and in the United States. If  the loan cannot exceed 70-80% of the price 
of the  dwelling,  the  default rate  has  been  minimal  at  least in  the  two  above-
mentioned countries. Consequently, its impact on the effective yield of mortgage 
bonds is of minor importance. In Sweden, where the dwelling can be accepted as 
collateral to its full value, loan losses have been a moderate problem, and the default 
risk has  affected bond yields.  The risk can be controlled especially well if the 
dwelling cannot be used as collateral unless it has been valued by an third party with 
at least some expertise in real estate markets. Any person who intends to buy a house 
or an  apartment must  ultimately pay for  it  with personal  income,  so  it seems 
remarkable to expect the would-be home buyer to save a certain percentage of the 
value of the home before buying it. 
Prepayment risk, on the other hand, present a tougher problem. It is the reason 
callable mortgage bonds normally carry a higher yield than government bonds. There 
are at least two ways to solve the problem: 
In case of prepayment, the debtor must pay for the eventual losses caused to 
investors, or 
Bonds could be divided into tranches as in the US 
In the light of US experience, the latter alternative has demonstrated itself to be an 
efficient solution to the problem. However, it may accentuate liquidity problems 
because it cannot be applied without dividing each issue into several sub-issues. This 
reduces the average size of a single bond issue. One could even imagine that the 
mortgage institution could be obliged to accept prepayments, but instead of calling 
bonds, it would protect itself with insurance or derivative contracts. 
The liquidity problem is also potentially serious. Consider, for example, Kuntien 
Asuntoluotto Oy, the real estate credit institution of the Finnish local government 
sector, which grants loans solely to the government sector. About 70% of the loan 
stock is either granted to the central government or guaranteed by it. In addition, the 
loans  are  normally guaranteed by real  estate  mortgage.  Public  authorities  have 
allowed insurance companies to classify bonds issued by Kuntien Asuntoluotto in the 
same credit risk category as central government bonds.  Despite this, the effective 
yield on the bonds of Kuntien Asuntoluotto can be about 50 basis points higher than 
the yield on otherwise similar benchmark bonds of the central government. This 
difference is  most likely the result of the lack of a liquid secondary market. In 
addition,  bonds issued by Kuntien Asuntoluotto are  not eligible for  repurchase 
agreements with the central bank. 
39 Hence,  if mortgage  loans  are  ever  to  be  securitised  in  Finland,  it  seems 
reasonable to pool as many housing loans as possible in one bond issue. In the light 
of the evidence obtained from the Finnish government benchmark bond system, a 
bond with an outstanding stock of less than FIMIO-20 billion is not-liquid, even if 
its liquidity is artificially improved by a primary dealer system. At the moment, the 
stock of housing loans in the books of Finnish banks is about FIM 100 billion. If all 
these housing loans were securitised (the extreme case), the stock of outstanding 
loans would need to be pooled so that there would be fewer than 5-10  issues in 
circulation. This might be possible, for instance, by securitising all housing loans 
through one  secondary institution,  a Finnish "Ginnie Mae".  Or alternatively,  if 
housing loan originators had identical credit ratings, it might be possible to create 
industry standards for bond issues; all mortgage bonds would have maturity dates 
and coupon rates that suit one of these standards. All bonds that suit the standard 
would then be traded on a To-Be-Announced basis, and would be treated as perfect 
substitutes in the trading system. For instance, one could offer a certain price for 7 % 
coupon bonds maturing on  15  October 2016. The seller would have the right to 
deliver bonds issued by any recognised issuer, provided they are in conformity with 
the standard. 
Housing loan systems simultaneously both reflect the general financial structure 
of  the country and affect it. In the US economy, securities markets are of paramount 
importance, whereas the role of  banks is not especially accentuated. US banks have, 
to  a  large  extent,  become  mere  intermediaries  between  security  issuers  and 
borrowers. In Finland, by contrast, ordinary banks have traditionally played a key 
role in all economic activities, even as major shareholders of large manufacturing 
corporations. Given their central role, their share of housing loans is understandably 
high. In Sweden, the government has traditionally been involved in the economy to 
a much larger extent than in most other Western nations, and the housing loan system 
has been planned and controlled by public authorities. Denmark, in turn, could be 
used as  an example of a country where the housing loan system has affected the 
general financial and economic structure of the country rather than vice versa. 
These national differences are to a large extent due to historical and institutional 
factors.  Legislation may have a lasting impact on  the  financial  structure of the 
country. As already concluded, Finnish economic policies almost killed the mortgage 
bank industry in the  post-WWn era,  whereas  Danish legislation favoured local 
mortgage institutions. In the US, disintermediation was encouraged by restrictive 
legislation that made it very difficult for local banks and S &  Ls  to  operate in a 
turbulent financial environment according to their traditional practices. Thus, when 
certain legislative factors are abolished, it is likely that their impact on the market 
shares and policies of local institutions will still last for a lengthy period, although 
the impact is unlikely to be permanent. 
Because mortgage institutions that finance themselves in the security market are 
able to  maintain their high market share in Denmark,  Sweden and  many other 
countries, it is difficult to understand why they could not become an important part 
of the financial sector in Finland. Legal obstacles to their entry have been largely 
abolished. At the moment, the main reason why such institutions do not enter the 
market may simply be the current weak demand for housing loans. If the demand for 
housing loans strengthens, which is likely to happen at least in the long run, new 
companies may enter the market. Therefore, we believe that it is completely realistic 
to expect bond-issuing mortgage institutions to emerge spontaneously in Finland, 
40 simply because there  is  likely to  be demand  for  such financial  intermediation 
services. 
The role of the government is  an important issue. Because the government 
budget deficit has  become a  major problem,  one -should  considef- the-situation· 
extremely carefully before implementing any policies that would either increase 
public  expenditures  or otherwise  increase  the  financial  responsibilities  of the 
government. Swedish experience has demonstrated that even a third-party guarantee 
offered by the government may turn out to be very costly,  at least, if no over-
collateralisation is required. Instead, the government is always involved in the market 
as the legislator, and it cannot dispose of  this responsibility. 
In  an  efficient  market  economy,  the  private  sector  establishes  companies 
whenever there is adequate demand for their services and public authorities do not 
intervene in the market without good reason. On the other hand, in the case of  bond 
issuing mortgage banks, the business could be competitive enough with just a few 
players. In fact, it can even be argued that an excessive number of institutions could 
easily damage the liquidity of the market for mortgage bonds.  At the moment, 
however, the question of  artificial barriers to entry to limit the number of bond-
issuing mortgage institutions is far removed from the main issues at hand, so we do 
not believe a  needs  criterion is  applicable  when  licenses  are  granted to  credit 
institutions.  In addition, it would most likely be against international agreements. 
It  is easy to argue that the public sector should take an active role in promoting 
lending to individuals who intend to buy new dwellings. A stronger demand would 
help the construction sector to recover, which would create employment possibilities 
and increase the stock of dwellings. But this does not necessarily imply that the 
government should make a direct monetary contribution to such activities. Take a 
real-life example: in the United States, the federal government has been involved in 
establishing the three major secondary mortgage institutions, but in the case of 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, the amount of taxpayers' money spent on the 
housing loan system has been minimal. 
The most compelling argument enhancing the demand for old dwellings might 
be desirable is  the present difficult situation of the banking sector. Many loans 
granted in the 1980s are backed by residential real estate that has lost as much as 
50 % of its nominal value since the price bubble of the late 1980s burst. A stronger 
demand for dwellings would certainly have a clear impact on the price level. This 
would both help over-indebted borrowers and reduce the amount of  loan losses. On 
the other hand, it would also force home buyers to incur higher levels of  debt. 
If a specific law  about the functioning of bond-issuing mortgage banks or 
comparable institutions will again be introduced in Finland, these institutions could 
be granted certain privileges, and in exchange for that a special status, they could be 
obliged to prioritise loans granted to  buyers of new homes.  For instance, to be 
eligible as a higher priority category institution, the mortgage bank's lending policies 
might require an especially high ratio of over-collateralisation in the case of old 
dwellings. It is easy to invent various ways to prioritise this specific category of 
credit institutions. For example: 
41 The preferential right to use a specific name (such as "Kiinnelainaobligaatio") 
for their bond issues, so that no other issuers would be allowed to use this name. 
Minor local credit institutions could be established even though their equity 
capital does not satisfy the standard EU requirement ofECU -5-million.Rather 
an ECU 1 million requirement could be applied in cases where other specific 
institution definitions were satisfied. Large corporations thus, could establish 
such institutions as a part of  their personnel policies, so that the employee status 
would make a person eligible to get a housing loan from the corporate mortgage 
bank. 
It might also be worthwhile to consider whether it should be legally feasible to grant 
loans that are dwelling-specific rather than individual-specific. Dwelling-specific 
loans make sense because the borrower can easily dispose of debtor status whenever 
the loan is no longer needed for its original purpose. The buyer, in turn, would 
automatically get a significant part of the required financing. On the other hand, the 
institutions that grant the loans should have the right to choose the debtors  they are 
willing to finance. It may be difficult to combine these two aspects. 
If  mortgage institutions that finance themselves by issuing bonds do emerge in 
Finland on a large scale, the market for fixed-income securities will undoubtably 
undergo deep change. These institutions would have an incentive to issue bonds with 
maturities exceeding 20 years.  Such fixed-income securities do not now exist in 
Finland. There might be demand for them among pension insurers, even if there 
would be no liquid secondary market for them.  However, if housing loans were 
mainly financed in the bond market, the demand for long-maturity fixed rate loans 
would increase, whereas the demand for loans with interest payments pegged to short 
money market rates would weaken. It is less obvious how the supply of financing in 
different parts of  the maturity spectrum would react. Hence, one could even speculate 
with the possibility that widespread use of  bond-financed mortgage loans might alter 
the shape of the yield curve, perhaps permanently. An interesting question is the 
nature of potential competition between the central government and mortgage bond 
issuers in the financial market. If large amounts of long-maturity FIM denominated 
securities are issued, one has to ask if  this potentially could make it more difficult for 
the central government to acquire long-term funding. 
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44 Appendix 
Bond issuer and loan 
originator the same 
institution 
Bonds callable at face 
value if mortgage 
prepaid 
Bond issuers guaranteed 
by the government 
Liquidity problems in 





Share of  mortgage loans 
financed in the security 
market out of all 
housing loans 
Is the loan personal or 
property-specific  ? 
Fixed/variable rate loans 
Maximum loan to value 
ratio in mortgages 
financed with bond 
issues 
Mortgage loan maturity 
A comparison of mortgage loans financed 
in security markets 
USA  Denmark  Sweden 
No  Yes  Yes 
(except for 
Stadshypotek) 
Yes  Both callable and  Yes 
non-callable bonds 
exist 
In most cases  No  Implicitly 
implicitly 
Some  Some  Some 
100-150 basis points  50-150 basis points  50-150 basis points 
20 % (1994)  91  % (1994)  59 % (1992) 
Slightly more than  >90%  Significantly more 
50%  than 50 % 
Partly personal,  Property-specific  Personal 
partly depends on 
the state 
Mostly fixed rate  Mostly fixed rate  Often fixed for a 
period of 2-5 years 
80%  80%  70 or 85 % 
Max 30 years  Max 30 years  Typically 20 years 
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